BITs may be interpreted as a mechanism for overcoming commitment problems between investor and host state in order not to infringe on the property rights of foreign direct investors, and ultimately to attract more investment. States thereby trade credibility for sovereignty as international investment law restricts the regulatory conduct of states to an unusual extent, subject to control through compulsory international adjudication. 7 A problem one may identify lies in that over the last years, the costs of BITs for states have become ever larger, primarily due to progressive interpretation of international arbitral tribunals. Hence, a trade-off may be identified: on the one hand existing BITs are made more powerful in protecting investments by progressive interpretation of international arbitral tribunals (thereby mitigating the commitment problem); on the other hand this development might endanger the future of BITs and thereby the protection of foreign direct investment (FDI) due to high sovereignty costs; in the language of mechanism design: investment protection lawyers seem to overlook states' participation constraint. States can and already do react to this trade-off in various manners if they think that the pendulum has swung too far: They might keep out of the game altogether by not signing and ratifying BITs. They might also water down the substantive protection of foreign investors rights by renegotiating BITs or when concluding new BITs. They might restrict the interpretational supremacy of International Tribunals or they might just not comply with an unfavourable award of an international tribunal. They might also exit the game by not prolonging the treaties. It is hypothesized that over-protection of foreign investment may lead to reactions which in the long run will weaken investment protection; i.e. international investment law possibly has passed a threshold of protection for foreign direct investors which endangers the system on the whole and in the long run, thereby leading to ultimately undesired less protection of foreign direct investment.
The paper is organized as follows: first, a short overview on the functioning of international investment law is given. The second part will shortly look upon the success of International Investment Law and the empirical evidence of the impact of BITs on FDI. The third part will sketch the economic logic of BITs and the fourth part will, by making use of economic theory, deal with the perils of success. The last section will conclude by including some suggestions on how the perils may be mitigated. 7 Harten, Gus van, and Martin Loughlin. 
II. International Investment Law -An Overview
Whereas international trade in goods and services is mainly governed by the WTO Agreement and its Annexes, there is no international legal equivalent for the governance of international investment, i.e. a huge part of the international capital flow. Several attempts of drafting an international agreement failed up to date: most recently, the Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, negotiated under OECD auspices, failed spectacularly in 1998 8 and also the attempt to negotiate that topic under WTO auspices 9 failed for the time being, when the so called "Singapore issue" of investment was taken from the negotiating agenda of the Doha
Round in summer 2004. 10 Thus, there are no encompassing multilateral legal rules for foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, the legal protection of foreign property has a long history 11 and there has been Customary International Law (CIL) protecting foreigners, including investors, by the so called "Minimum Standard of Treatment" 12 and compensation requirements for expropriations. 13 But this protection is, as already hinted at by the name, 8 In 1995, OECD Ministers launched negotiations on a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) with high standards of liberalisation and investment protection, with effective dispute settlement procedures, and open to non-Members. Negotiations were discontinued in April 1998 and will not be resumed. For the negotiating history and reasons for failure, see Geiger, Rainer. 1998 10 Ministers from WTO member-countries decided at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference to set up new working groups: on trade and investment, on competition policy, on transparency in government procurement as well as trade facilitation. These four subjects were originally included on the Doha Development Agenda. The carefully-negotiated mandate was for negotiations to start after the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference, "on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations". There was no consensus, and the members agreed on 1 August 2004 to drop the issues (except trade facilitation) from the Doha agenda. 11 For an overview see Lowenfeld, Andreas F. 2002. International Economic Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press., at 391-414. 12 For a discussion of the Customary International Law character of protective norms in BITs, see Kishoiyian, Bernard. 1994 
III. The Success of International Investment Law
The success of International Investment Law in the past 15 years has been phenomenal. 25 Not only have we seen a proliferation of BITs but the system is also used by the relevant actors, The problem of the host state is then to make its commitment more credible. As ex ante the potential host state can promises to honour the property right of investor, ex post, the state may renege on its promises, if there is no sanction. Firms can usually not disinvest in full once they have placed a fix investment. States can take advantage of that in several ways, e.g. by increasing taxes (even though they might have promised a preferential tax regime for the investor), by changing the royalty division in case of natural resources extraction, 35 or by prohibiting the augmentation of prices in cases of privatized utilities. 36 The host state will do so if the net benefit of reneging on its promise is greater than the net benefit of complying with its promise. As firms anticipate a possible later expropriation or unfair treatment, they may refrain from investment -and socially undesired less investment would be the result. 
V. The Perils of Success
On the first sight, economic logic tells us that BITs are an adequate mechanism for the commitment problem. Nonetheless, we face an optimization problem which I wish to outline here. More generally speaking, commitment problems in PIL are best solved by "Hard Law". 42 Abbott and Snidal identify three variables in order to determine the "hardness" of an Indeterminate legal terms, as e.g. "fair and equitable treatment" are often interpreted investor friendly, i.e. foreign investors are often treated more favourably than national investors, e.g. in environmental regulation matters 52 or in economic emergency cases. As mentioned above, the invocation of state necessity in the BIT and in Customary International Law 53 by Argentina due to its economic crisis in 2000/2001 was not followed by the tribunal, thereby obligating Argentina to pay compensation for the tariff freeze of public utilities and its devaluation of its currency as this was seen to be an infringement of "fair and equitable treatment". 54 National investors did not get any compensation as their way to ICSID is barred.
Furthermore, the definition of investor in the BITs has been a contentious issue as here the definition of investors decides on who can get the protection of a BIT and to whom the promise of the state was made. It might happen that the state faces an unexpected extension of the circle of promisees. In Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine 55 , a dispute mounted under the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT, where a group of Ukrainian investors had incorporated a legal entity in Lithuania, and then used that entity to invest back into Ukraine -and thereby avail themselves of the protections promised to "Lithuanian" investors by Ukraine under the BIT.
The majority of the Tribunal stated that the parties to a BIT were free to determine the criteria to determine nationality 56 and set the definition of investor and foreign control of a local entity for purposes of Art. 25 (2)(b) of the ICSID Convention. In a rare occurrence, the President of an ICSID arbitral tribunal, Prosper Weil, has dissented from this decision on jurisdiction and has signalled a concern for the "integrity" of the ICSID system, as the interpretation of the majority would ultimately allow nationals to seek protection against their own state in international tribunals. That, in his opinion, would destabilize the system as such the teleological interpretation of an umbrella clause: "The object and purpose rule also supports such an interpretation. While it is not permissible, as is too often done regarding BITs, to interpret clauses exclusively in favour of investors, here such an interpretation is justified. and go against international law principles. In Aguas del Tunari v. Boliva, the investors migrated the holding of Aguas del Tunari from the Bahamas to Luxembourg, whose shares were in turn held by a newly set up firm in the Netherlands, thereby using the NetherlandsBolivian BIT in order to go to ICSID. 57 The definition of the nationality of corporate entities is a long known problem, but becomes ever more pressing in a more globalized world where firms are every more complicatedly structured. It is unclear whether tribunals accept or pierce the corporate veil. When they choose the latter, it is also unclear whether they stop at the first level shareholders or whether they look at the ultimate beneficiaries or stop somewhere in between. 58 The possibility of BIT-shopping by enterprises is therefore a problem from the viewpoint of states.
A further unforeseen circumstance is the interpretation of the most favoured nation (MFN) clause, a multilateralization devise par excellence which allows investors to get the protection of any other BIT concluded by the host state in case it is more favourable than the BIT between the host state and his home state. Whereas MFN clauses were supposed to apply only to substantive issues, in Maffezzini v. Spain, 59 the ICSID tribunal decided that the MFN clause applies also to procedural provisions.
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A further contentious issue is the so called "umbrella clause". The interpretation debate over the concrete meaning of this -potentially powerful -provision found in many BITs has high stakes as it decides on the applicable law as well as the forum of the dispute (national vs. The list could be continued but may suffice for getting the picture: The problem arising through progressive interpretation 63 is that states thought of giving a promise P A in t 1 and find out in t 2 that they promised P B (with P B > P A ). By a learning process, it is to be expected that in the light of the experiences with too favourable or unforeseen promises, countries will turn to less favourable promises or restrict the interpretational discretion of international tribunals, if they think that the net benefit of credible commitment is turning negative. They might change the promise P A for the future by various means:
They may just not enter the system by declining to ratify BITs; indeed we do see a relative decline in conclusion of BITs. Those arguments do not only apply to developing countries. Ever more, the capital flows from transition or developing countries such as China and India to the OECD countries (or other developing countries). It seems that only the USA has gone through a learning process by NAFTA, being the defendant state in some cases and changing its new Model BIT in 2004 accordingly by making it more precise, giving less leeway to arbitral tribunals. 75 Western
European states until now were spared being a defendant in investor to states disputes (with the exception of the European transition countries). That might change soon under the Energy Charter Treaty which also provides for investor to state dispute settlement, energy policy being a highly contested field. It might well be that then those countries might also become more cautious in negotiating too sovereignty restricting BITs once they realize that the reciprocity of those treaties exists not only de iure but also de facto.
It is no coincidence that minority opinions in arbitral awards do issue warnings of destroying the system if the interpretation is stretched too far. Overprotection by too strict commitments ex ante or progressive protection ex post may lead to reactions of states which will weaken international investment protection in the long run -a normatively not desirable outcome.
VI. Conclusion and Outlook
One example of effective PIL is the case of international investment protection. But this effectiveness comes with perils, namely that states would wish to weaken the system in order not to incur too high sovereignty costs. We therefore face a dilemma: International Investment Law may be made too successful from the viewpoint of states which may lead to less protection of investors in the long run. The point of optimality between cost of commitment and benefit of FDI still needs to be found. This resembles a problem well known in contract theory, namely inefficient collaterals. Economic modelling accordingly is in progress.
States´ participation constraint comes into play only if the net benefit of giving credible commitments to investors equals or is below zero. And it may well be the case that certain host countries -competing with other countries for scarce capital -cannot afford to lower the standards of protection. But it would be short sighted to rely on that. There might be circumstances in which we come close to situations where states prefer to opt out, e.g. certain
Latin American countries, which -within the Calvo doctrine tradition -would return to an old attitude towards FDI. Therefore, it is useful to think of other less costly instruments for states 75 BITs states retain the right to admit foreign investment and they themselves are probably best positioned to judge whether a specific investment is beneficial to their development, this does not solve the problem of a too sweeping unforeseen protection ex post. Of course, the question of quis iudicabit is to the fore of those problems. A more balanced interpretational approach might be achieved, as Judge Buergenthal suggests, by having stricter conflict of interest rules for arbitrators 77 or by having a general appeals procedure within ICSID, as
proposed by the ICSID Secretariat.
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A thorough economic analysis of International Investment Law is still missing. There are intricate legal problems with a variety of actors (here, the "black box" of the state behaviour was not broken up in order to look to the internal processes determining external policy)
which are difficult to model. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to show the basic lines of economic logic governing this issue area. This paper means to highlight some of the issues pressing in the current discussion of investment law; a modelling of the problems are on the research agenda.
